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Abstract 
This thesis begins with a general overview of pseudo-random number 
generators and some of their applications. This thesis then describes their 
applications to cryptography, and some additional requirements imposed by 
cryptography. This thesis then provides an introduction to the ring of quater-
nions, and discusses how they can be included in pseudo-random number 
generators. Finally, this thesis provides a description of the performance of 
these generators. 
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I. Introduction 
In many computer applications, it is desirable to be able to produce a 
random number. In general, these are applications where the designer has 
tried to model the randomness of the real world. A simulated card game in 
which the user is dealt the same hand every time is not very interesting. One 
solution is to build specialized hardware that connects the computer to the 
outside world. The computer could then choose random numbers based on 
radioactive decay rates, or on the static between radio stations. A very dif-
ferent solution is to produce a sequence of "random looking" numbers from 
an initial seed. 
One of the first attempts at this was by Von Neuman [5]. His method is 
known as the Middle-Squares Generator: 
• Start with a four digit integer 
• Square it 
• Pull out the middle four digits 
• Repeat as needed 
Because these types of algorithms are deterministic systems trying to 
emulate randomness, we call them pseudo-random number generators or 
PRNGs. 
As an example of using the Middle-Squares Generator, if we choose to 
start with 5604, we square it to get 31404816, so our new number is 4048. The 
next number in the sequence would be 3863, since 4048 X 4048 = 16386304. 
The sequence continues 9227, 1375, 8906 .... This type of generator has the 
following advantages: the numbers certainly appear to be random, the next 
number can be easily produced, and the only knowledge we need (beyond 
the algorithm) is the present number. This generator does have its flaws. 
For one, the numbers can stop appearing random. If we continue the previ-
ous example long enough, we find the sequence 8441, 2504, 2700, 2900 .... 
Every successive iteration will produce a multiple of 100. Worse than this, 
the sequence will degenerate to 4100, 8100, 6100, 2100, 4100 ... - we have 
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come upon a short cycle. 
This highlights the main drawback to the Middle Squares Generator- we 
would like to avoid falling into traps like this, but the algorithm is sufficiently 
complex that it is difficult to say which innocuous-looking starting numbers 
will produce undesirable results. The solution to this last problem is to use 
an algorithm that is easier to analyze. 
The Middle-Squares Generator demonstrates one of the areas in which a 
sequence of numbers based on a generator using an algebraic expression is 
vastly different from a sequence of truly random numbers. At some point, 
the generator must repeat itself. To minimize the impact that this has, we 
want to design generators that will go as long as possible without repeating. 
The Linear Congruence Generator has the form: 
Xn+l = axn + C mod m. 
In addition to the strengths of the Middle-Squares Generator, this system 
has the added advantage that we can give conditions on our choices of a,c, 
and m so that we have maximum period before repeating. As stated in [5], 
the necessary and sufficient criteria are 
• c and m are relatively prime 
• a - 1 is a multiple of p, for all p I m 
• 4 I (a - 1) if 4 I m 
A linear congruence generator satisfying these requirements will cycle 
through all m numbers between 0 and m- 1 before repeating. For imple-
mentations of this generator, m is generally taken to be the largest number 
that can be held in the computer's register, so the reduction modulo m is 
taken care of by overflow. The Linear Congruence Generator is the PRNG 
most commonly used for simulation purposes, since it is fast and has long 
period. 
II. Random Numbers and Cryptography 
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The cipher systems used to encrypt data fall into two broad classes: 
stream ciphers and block ciphers. The main distinction is in how much 
plaintext material they encrypt at a time. Block ciphers, such as DES or 
IDEA [8], first divide the plaintext into blocks (of typically sixty-four bits) 
and then individually encrypt these blocks with a common key. Stream ci-
phers, on the other hand, encrypt plaintext in smaller units - at most a few 
bits at a time. The two types of ciphers draw their security from different 
sources. Block ciphers have at their heart a complicated, non-invertible func-
tion that operates on the plaintext. Also, block ciphers may shuffle around 
the plaintext bits. Stream ciphers are built around a cryptographically se-
cure pseudorandom number generator, or CSPRNG. The generator is used 
to produce a key bit for each plaintext bit, and the two are added modulo 2. 
The Vernam Cipher is an encryption scheme that offers provably un-
breakable security. All that is needed is a random key that is as long as the 
plaintext. The ith ciphertext bit Ci is produced by: 
where Pi is the ith plaintext bit and Ki is the ith key bit. As long as the key 
is truly random, an attacker can never find the plaintext from the ciphertext. 
If the key is truly random, every possible key is equally likely, so every possi-
ble plaintext could have produced a given ciphertext with equal probability, 
which means that an attacker who has intercepted the ciphertext can gain no 
knowledge about the original message. The primary drawback of this system 
is that it requires as much key as plaintext. That means that in addition 
to transmitting the ciphertext, the sender must get an equal amount of key 
material to the intended recipient. 
In essence, stream ciphers represent an attempt to implement the Vernam 
Cipher with a shorter key. Instead of having equal amounts of key material 
and message, as required by the Vernam Cipher, a stream cipher requires 
only a small amount of key, and from that produces an arbitrary length out-
put. This output can then be used as key material in the manner described 
above. Because of the determinism of a PRNG, the output is completely 
non-random, and we lose the unbreakability of the Vernam Cipher. Any reg-
ularity in the output of a CSPRNG is a potential weakness to be exploited 
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by an attacker. 
The primary feature that separates a pseudo-random number generator 
from a cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generator is pre-
dictability. Ideally, we would like it to be the case that no matter how many 
previous outputs an attacker has access to, he has no advantage to predict-
ing the next output. In practice, this can never be the case. Since these 
algorithms are to be run on finite state machines, their corresponding peri-
ods are also finite, which allows an attacker to eventually be able to predict 
the sequence flawlessly. However, it is often possible to "break" a generator 
long before it has repeated itself. For example, suppose we are watching the 
output of a linear congruence generator, and we know the value of m, but 
not a or c. We can solve for a after seeing only three consecutive outputs: 
Let the outputs be x 0, xi, and x2. Then we know that XI = ax0 + c mod m 
and x2 = axi + c mod m. Then x2 - XI= a( xi- x0) mod m, from which we 
get the value of a, and can substitute to find c. The process of breaking the 
generator is more difficult if we don't know m, but it can still be done with 
relative ease. 
In light of these sorts of attacks, we do two things. First, we make the 
period very long, so that someone cannot see every output. Also, we strive to 
make it more difficult to set up and solve equations to find the "parameters" 
of our generator. 
There are certain advantages to using a stream cipher over a block ci-
pher. If we imagine that we own a bank that has a branch office, we want 
to be able to communicate securely between the two, in order to authorize 
transactions. If we use a block cipher, we will be responsible and change 
the key fairly often. An attacker can go to our branch office and make a 
deposit to his account. The branch office will then send an encrypted record 
of the transaction to the main bank. If the attacker can listen in on the 
line between the branch office and the main headquarters, he can record the 
message sent. Then he can send the message again later. If he does so before 
we change the key, the main office will decrypt the message, and thinking it 
is a record of a new transaction, the bank will credit another deposit to his 
account without a second transaction having taken place. 
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If, on the other hand, we were using a stream cipher, this type of attack (a 
"replay" attack) would not work. If the attacker sent the encypted communi-
cation that he had recorded, which had been valid earlier, the message would 
come across as nonsense since the message would have been encrypted with 
a different set of key stream bits. The price we pay is that the CSPRNGs at 
the two offices would now be out of synch with each other - any subsequent 
real messages we send would also come out as nonsense, for essentially the 
same reason. 
In practice, we could adjust our protocol to make this sort of attack 
against a block cipher infeasible. Remedies include adding a time-stamp or 
a serial number to the message. But this example does illustrate that there 
are some strengths inherent to stream ciphers. 
The most generalized stream cipher consists of a "next-state function" Is, 
and an "output function" Ia· A machine is then set into an initial state, uo. 
The machine produces an output z0 = la(u0 ), and proceeds to a new state 
a! = Is( a 0). The first plaintext bit is then encrypted with z0• This cycle is 
repeated until all the plaintext has been encrypted. In the most general case, 
fs and Ia can both be keyed, and key can be introduced into the internal 
state at any time. In practice, key is used only to set CTo and Is· 
Often, it is enlightening to imagine the different internal states as points in 
space. We can create paths between them in accordance with the next-state 
function, so that there is a path connecting O"i to u; if and only if u; = ls(ui)· 
Any point, then, will lie on either an arc or a cycle, and every arc will lead 
to a cycle. It would seem difficult, however, to determine whether a given 
point is on an arc or a cycle. The most obvious approach is to iterate the 
generator from the given point, and store every state the generator has been 
in. If the first repeated state is the original one, then the original state is 
on a cycle. Otherwise, the state is on an arc. Unfortunately, this approach 
requires that we compare the current state with every previous state, which 
will be a time-consuming process. 
In [7], Ritter suggests a clever way to make this determination without 
having to store every previous state. His method consists of initializing two 
instances of the same generator, Gl and G2, to the same state u0 . Then, 
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we clock G2 twice as fast as Gl, and at each step we compare the internal 
states of the two generators. If Gl and G2 are ever in the same state, uk, 
then we know that the current state lies on a cycle. In addition, we can find 
the period of the cycle by counting the number of iterations of Gl it takes 
before Gl is again in state Uk. Furthermore, if we continue to iterate Gl and 
it reaches state uk again before reaching u0 , then we know that u1 was on an 
arc, and we can calculate the arc length between uo and the cycle containing 
(J'k. 
III. Non-Commutative Algebra 
This treatment is based on the one found in [4]. 
The ring of quaternions was invented by Hamilton as a generalization of 
the complex numbers from two to four dimensions. Recall that the complex 
number a = a + bi can be represented as 
and that this representation defines an isomorphism between the complex 
numbers and a subring of the two-by-two matrices with real entries. Similarly, 
the quaternion number a = a + bi + cj + dk can be represented as 
( a+ bi c + di) a = -c + di a - bi · 
Using this defining relation, we can determine how multiplication of 
quaternions works: The quaternion 
0 + i + Oj + Ok = ( ~ ~i ) 
satisfies 
i2 = (0 + i + Oj + Ok)(O + i + Oj + Ok) 
( i 0 ) ( i 0 ) ( -1 0 ) = 0 -i 0 -i = 0 -1 ' 
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which is equivalent to the quaternion -1+0i+Oj+Ok = -1. This is the same 
relation we observe with the complex numbers when defined by i = ..;=I. In 
fact, the complex numbers are a subring of the ring of quaternions, so that 
these i's are one and the same. Similarly, we can use the fact that 
j = 0 + Oi + j + Ok = ( ~1 ~), 
and 
k = 0 + Oi + Oj + k = ( ~ ~ ) , 
to show that P = k2 = -1. Additionally, we find that 
ij = (0 + i + Oj + Ok)(O + Oi + j + Ok) 
( i 0)(0 1) (0 i) - 0 -i -1 0 - i 0 ' 
which is 0 + Oi + Oj + k = k, but that 
ji = (0 + Oi + j + Ok)(O + i + Oj + Ok) 
- ( ~1 ~) ( ~ ~i ) - ( ~i ~i)' 
which is 0 + Oi + Oj- k = -k. Similarly, we can show that jk = i, kj = -i, 
ki = j, and ik = - j. This demonstrates the characteristic of the quaternions 
that we will be exploiting: in general, multiplication is non-commutative. Be-
fore we show that the non-zero quaternions form a non-commutative group 
under multiplication, we introduce two more terms: 
We define the conjugate of a = a+ bi + cj + dk to be a = a- bi- cj- dk. 
Then we define the norm of a to be N(a) = aa =(a+ bi + cj + dk)(a- bi-
cj - dk) = a2 + b2 + c2 + d?-. Now we would like to show that this has the 
usual norm property: N(af3) = N(a)N(f3). To do this, we first notice that 
. ( a + bi c + di ) . the determmant of a = + d. b. IS 
-c z a- z 
(a+ bi)(a- bi)- ( -c + di)(c + di) 
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(a+ bi)(a- bi) + (c + di)(c- di) 
(a2 + b2) + (c2 + d2) 
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2. 
Then we recall that for square matrices A and B, det(AB) = det(A)det(B), 
so that N(af3) = det(af3) = det(a)det(f3) = N(a)N(f3). 
Theorem 1: The non-zero quaternions form a non-commutative group 
under multiplication. 
Proof: The first property we must demonstrate is closure: Let a = 
a+bi+cj+dk, and f3 = w+xi+yj+zk. Then af3 = (aw-bx-cy-dz)+(ax+ 
bw + cz- dy)i + (ay- bz+cw + dx)j + (az+ by- ex +dw)k, which is also an 
element of the ring of quaternions. Then we need to show that every element 
has a multiplicative inverse: Let a be a non-zero element of the ring of quater-
nions. Then let f3 = afN(a), so that af3 = aafN(a) = N(a)/N(a) = 1. 
For an identity, we notice that 1 + Oi + Oj + Ok corresponds to the identity 
matrix, and hence is a multiplicative identity. Finally, quaternion multipli-
cation inherits its associativity from that of matrix multiplication. D 
It is natural to ask under what conditions multiplication is commutative, 
or what the center of the group of non-zero quaternions looks like. 
Theorem 2: The quaternion a is central if and only if a is a real number. 
Proof: It will be helpful to show that all real numbers are in the center 
first. Let r = r + Oi + Oj + Ok be a real number. Then 
r = ( ~ ~) = r ( ~ ~) = ri, 
where I is the identity matrix. We know that real numbers commute with 
matrices, and that for any matrix A, AI =I A, so that r I the commutes with 
A, which means that real numbers are contained in the center. 
Now, we must show that if an element is in the center, it is a real number. 
Let a= a+ bi + cj + dk be in the center. Then a must commute with every 
element of the quaternions. In particular, we know that 
az = za, 
aJ = Ja, 
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and 
ak = ka. 
From the first equation, we have ai = ai+bii+cji+dki = -b+ai-dj+ck, 
and ia = ai+ibi+icj+idk = ai+bii+cij+dik = -b+ai-dj+ck. We can 
perform this middle step since a, b, c and d are real numbers. Equating the 
two gives us d = -d and c = -c, so that c = d = 0. Next, we stipulate that 
aj = ja. This gives us aj = aj + bij + cjj + dkj = -c- di + aj + bk, and 
ja = ja + jbi + jcj + jdk = -c + di + aj- bk. Equating these two gives us 
that d = -d and b = -b, so that b = d = 0. Using the third restriction gives 
us that b = c = 0. From this, we know that a is of the form a+ Oi + Oj + Ok, 
and hence is a real number. 0 
For our purposes, we will be interested in a homomorphic image of a sub-
ring of H - the quaternions with rational coefficients - called Hp, where p 
is a prime. 
Definition: Let p be an odd prime. Then a is an element of Hp if and 
only if a= a(+ bi + cj + dk, for some a, b, c, dE Zp, where (is defined as 
( 1 + i + j + k) /2, and Zp is the ring of integers modulo p. 
For convenience, we identify a(+ bi + cj + dk with (a, b, c, d). Addition 
is then defined in the obvious way, so that (a, b, c, d) + (a', b', d, d') = (a + 
a', b + b', c + d, d + d'), with the components reduced modulo p. If we follow 
the rules for quaternion multiplication, denoted x, it is a matter of simple 
computation to show that 
(a, b, c, d) x (a', b', c', d') = ( -aa'- 2bb'- 2cd- 2dd'- a'(b + c +d)- a(b' + d + d'), 
aa' + bb' + cd + dd' + a'(b +c)+ a(b' + d') + cd'- dd, 
aa' + bb' + cd + dd' + a'(c +d)+ a(b' +d)+ b'd- bd', 
aa' + bb' + cd + dd' + a'(b +d)+ a(d + d') + bd- b'c). 
Lemma: If a E Hp then a E Hp. 
Proof: Let a E Hp. Then a = (a, b, c, d) for some a,b,c, and d E Zp. 
Then a = a(+ bi + cj + dk = a/2 + (a/2 + b)i + (a/2 + c)j + (a/2 + d)k, 
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so a= a/2- (al2 + b)i- (al2 + c)j- (al2 + d)k =a(+ ( -b- a)i + ( -c-
a)j + ( -d- a)k =(a, -b- a, -c- a, -d- a) E HP.0. 
The norm of an element in Hp is defined the same way it is for the 
quaternions: N(a) = aa. So, if a= (a,b,c,d), then 
N(a) N((a,b,c,d)) 
- N(a(1 + i + j + k)l2 + bi + cj + dk) 
- N(al2 + (b + af2)i + (c + al2)j + (d + al2)k) 
- (a/2)2 + (b + a/2? + (c + al2? + (d + al2)2 
- a
2 I 4 + b2 + ab + a2 I 4 + c2 + ac + a2 I 4 + d2 + ad + a2 I 4 
_ a
2 + b2 + c2 + d2 + a(b + c +d). 
Theorem 3: In Hp, a is a zero-divisor if and only if N(a) = 0. 
Proof: Let a be a zero-divisor, but with N(a) =f:. 0. Then there exists 
a f3 =f:. 0 such that af3 = 0. We know that there exists a k > 0 such that 
N(a)k = 1 in Zp. This means that (aa)k = 1 in Zp, so that akak = 1 in Hp. 
Then {3 = 1{3 = akakf3 = akak-1(af3) = akak-10 = 0, a contradiction. 
Let N(a) = 0. Then aa = N(a) = 0, so a is a zero-divisor. D 
IV. Some Traditional Generators 
Over the years, many different types of PRNGs have been suggested and 
analyzed for their cryptographic properties. One of the more interesting gen-
erators is the linear feedback shift register, or LFSR. Some researchers, Bruce 
Schneier for one, do not recommend their use. On the other hand, he reports 
that LFSRs are currently used in the US military's field ciphers (8]. 
An LFSR consists of n cells which each hold one bit. We will denote 
their contents by b0 , b1, .•. , bn_1• The next-state function is determined by 
n keyed constants eo, c1, ... , cn_1. In order to go from one state to the next, 
we set the new bn-1 equal to L:j,:-J bici mod 2, and the new bi equal to the 
old bi+l for j = 0, 1, ... , n- 2. The output is then b0 • 
It is clear that this generator can be stuck in a very short loop. If each 
of the bi 's is zero, then the state will not be changed by application of the 
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next-state function. On the other hand, if we initialize the LFSR to some 
non-zero state, and if we choose our c/s so that xn + I:j,:J Cjxi is a primitive, 
irreducible polynomial in x, then the LFSR will loop through all 2n - 1 
nonzero states before returning to the original state. In addition, the output 
sequence has some desirable properties: 
• Of the 2n - 1 outputs, we will have almost an even number of zeros 
and ones (2n-l versus 2n-l- 1) 
• Every string of outputs n bits long will occur exactly once, with the 
exception of the all-zero string. 
Countless ways have been devised to combine multiple LFSRs to pro-
duce more complicated outputs. As a consequence, we talk about the linear 
complexity of a system of LFSRs. The linear complexity is the length of 
the shortest single LFSR necessary to replicate the output of the system. It 
turns out that if n is the linear complexity of our generator, then with 2n 
consecutive output bits, we can break the generator. The method is based 
on the fact that the first n bits to come out form the initial state of the gen-
erator, which give us a0 . We then set up n linear equations for the feedback 
coefficients c0 , c1 , ••• , Cn-17 which define Is· This set of equations can easily 
be solved by Gaussian elimination or by the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm 
[6]. Berlekamp-Massey takes advantage of the special form of the equations 
to more efficiently solve for the coefficients. Gaussian elimination requires 
O(n3 /3) operations compared to O(n2 ) for Berlekamp-Massey. In either case, 
the 2n bits needed is very short compared to the period of 2n - 1 of the gen-
erator. 
The 1/p generator is another PRNG that has very good output sequences, 
but which also is broken without much difficulty. If we choose a prime p, we 
can produce a sequence of b-ary digits by expanding 1/p in some base b. This 
sequence will have the property that every sequence of fewer than logbp digits 
will occur in every period, and a sequence of logbp will occur at most once. 
In their paper [2], Blum, Blum, and Shub describe a method to efficiently 
recover p given only logb(2p2) consecutive output digits. 
Despite the ease with which the previous generators can be broken, there 
do exist random number generators that are very difficult to break. These 
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generally have one of the famous" hard" cryptography problems at their core. 
We can design generators whose difficulty in breaking is based on factoring, 
discrete logs, or quadratic residuosity. The "power generator" has its next-
state function given by xi+l = xf mod N. If we take d = 2 and N = pq, for 
p and q primes both congruent to 3 mod 4, then we have the BBS generator, 
which is considered one of the most secure PRNGs. In their paper [2], Blum, 
Blum, and Shub argue that an ability to predict the parity of next output 
given the previous output, with success any better than flipping a fair coin, 
can be used to guess quadratic residuosity. A similar CSPRNG has the form 
where g is a primitive element of ZN. This generator draws its strength from 
the difficulty of taking discrete logarithms. These last two generators have 
something else in common, in addition to their security. They both require 
exponentiation, and are therefore rather slow to implement. 
Steven Wolfram devised a family of generators based on Cellular Au-
tomata [8]. In some sense, they are similar to LFSRs, since they too are 
composed of a number of cells which each hold a bit. However, the next-state 
function is very different. Then registers are updated in parallel, according 
to a constant rule, which can be key-dependent. One of the rules suggested 
by Wolfram updates each cell by 
i+l - i XOR ( i OR i ) ak - ak-1 ak ak+l ' 
where the subscripts are taken modulo n, and the superscripts emphasize 
that the cells are updated in parallel. The output is taken to be the sequen-
tial states of one of the cells. There is a paper [1] which purports to show 
that the outputs of cellular automata are equivalent to those of LFSRs. This 
is surprising, given that one may make the next-state equations as non-linear 
as one likes. For some reason, the paper seems to consider only certain rules, 
all of which are linear. 
V. Some Non-Commutative Generators 
The motivation behind looking at non-commutative versions of estab-
lished PRN Gs is that one hopes to be able to use the existing theory to 
analyze the properties of a generator, while at the same time making the 
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generators more resistant to attack. For example, an obvious adaptation of 
the linear congruence generator has the form 
where a, b, c E Hp. If we then try to break the generator in the same manner 
as we did earlier, we can set up the equation a(x1 - x0 )b = (x2 - xi). The 
beauty is that we are prevented from solving for either a or b in closed form, 
as we were able to do so simply in the commutative case. This does not mean 
that it is impossible to solve for a and b- we will discuss a simple technique 
later in the paper- but it is encouraging that we have transformed the most 
trivially-broken of all PRNGs into something far from trivial. 
As we said above, in addition to requiring a CSPRNG to be difficult to 
predict, we also require that the output have "good statistics". Since our 
sequences are pseudorandom, there exist statistical tests that will be able to 
distinguish between any of the sequences we produce and sequences coming 
from uniform random distributions. Instead of trying to design statistical 
tests to defeat the generators we created, we set down two benchmark tests 
that should give us some indication for how good the generators are. We 
chose p = 7, so that all of the generators we tested produced output in the 
form of a string of elements of Z7 • The first test looks at the distribution 
of symbols, and the second test examines the spacing between consecutive 
appearances of each symbol. For example, one of the things we count is the 
number of times consecutive fives are separated by three non-fives. The re-
sults of these two tests are compared to what we would expect if the numbers 
were drawn randomly from a uniform distribution. So, for the first test, we 
compare the distribution produced by the generator to a uniform distribu-
tion, and for the second test we compare the distribution of spacings to a 
geometric distribution. 
One of the immediate problems of trying to create non-commutative gen-
erators from the PRNGs discussed above is that the theory that has been 
developed is not always readily adaptable to the non-commutative case. For 
instance, we know that for an LFSR to have full period, the feedback poly-
nomial must be irreducible and primitive. It is understood how to satisfy 
this when the polynomial is in Z2[x], but what happens when we take the 
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coefficients from Hp? 
There is also a dearth of information regarding methods of producing 
general solutions to even low order equations. This would suggest promise 
for generators like 
xi+l = axibxic + dxie + j, 
whose commutative counterparts are cryptographically weak. Similarly, we 
can foil the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm by mixing left and right multipliers 
in our non-commutative LFSR. 
VI. What Are We Able to Say About These Generators? 
Multiplying elements in HP is a computationally more expensive opera-
tion than multiplying integers. Since speed of implementation is certainly one 
criterion by which to judge CSPRNGs, we limited ourselves to using as few 
multiplication operations as we could. For this reason, the non-commutative 
generators we concentrated on were: 
• a linear congruence generator 
• a two-term LFSR generator 
• a five-cell cellular automata generator. 
Of these three, the only one to show "good statistics" on a consistent basis 
was the cellular automata generator. 
The non-commutative Linear Congruence Generator has the next-state 
function given by xi+l = axib + c, where neither a nor b is a zero-divisor. For 
the first two generators, we "tapped" the sequence using fo( a, b, c, d) = c as 
the output of the PRNG output. That is, the output digit is the coefficient 
of j. The output of a typical run of seven hundred iterations can be summa-
rized as: 
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output digit number of occurences 
0 116 
1 116 
2 116 
3 58 
4 117 
5 59 
6 118 
Worse than this is the spacing between outputs. For each output digit 
(across the top), the column below it shows the distribution of spacing of 
sequential occurences of that digit. So the first number under 2, for exam-
ple, shows how often a 2 appeared immediately following the appearance of 
another 2. 
II 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 58 58 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 58 0 0 0 59 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0 0 0 0 116 1 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 57 0 0 0 58 
10 58 57 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 57 0 58 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
> 12 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
If we look down column four, the LCG never produced two fours in a row, 
nor were there ever two fours separated by one non-four. In fact, with one 
exception, every time the LCG output a four, the next four appeared exactly 
six iterations later. It is clear that this in no way resembles the geometric 
distribution to which we are comparing it. 
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For the non-commutative LFSR, we used the next-state equation 
Xi+l = axi + xib, 
where again neither a nor b is a zero-divisor. The results for this generator 
were not good either. A typical output of the symbol frequencies for seven 
hundred iterations is 
output digit number of occurences 
0 300 
1 66 
2 67 
3 68 
4 65 
5 67 
6 67 
and for the spacing is: 
II 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
0 66 0 0 17 16 0 0 
1 68 0 17 0 0 17 0 
2 166 17 0 17 16 0 17 
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 16 0 0 0 0 17 
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 16 17 16 17 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
11 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
> 12 0 33 34 16 16 33 33 
For our non-commutative Cellular Automata, we used five cells, and the 
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next-state function was given by: 
Because this next-state function involves only multiplication, it is important 
that the cells not contain zero-divisors. In every instance we looked at where 
one of the cells initially contained a zero-divisor, the generator quickly de-
generated to the fixed point of a1 = a2 = aa = a4 = a5 = (0, 0, 0, 0). 
Because of this, we need more information about the zero-divisors. Specif-
ically, we have two questions: how many zero-divisors are there, and how are 
the different elements of Zp distributed among the components of the zero-
divisors? Knowing the answer to the first question would allow us to deter-
mine the size of the phase-space, while knowing the answer to the second one 
would let us know more about the population from which these numbers are 
coming. We know there are p4 elements in Hp and there are just as many of 
the form (0, b, c, d) as there are (1, b, c, d). This is why, for the LFSR and the 
LCG, we compare the sequence of output digits to a uniform random distri-
bution. But for theCA, excluding the zero-divisors may change the "mother 
population". We can still use the same two statistical tests, but we have to 
be careful - the distribution of occurences may no longer be uniform, which 
would also affect the gap distribution. 
To answer the first question, we recall that the zero-divisors have norm 
congruent to zero. So to find the number of zero-divisors, we must count the 
number of solutions to N(a, b, c, d) = a2 +b2+c2+~+a(b+c+d) = 0 mod p, 
with a, b, c, dE Zp. We conjecture that there are p3 + p2 - p solutions to this 
equation. Through an exhaustive count, this has been verified for p ~ 67. In 
addition, it has shown to be true for the p = 1 mod 4 case [3]. It is worth 
noting that we can show that there are as many solutions to this equation 
as there are solutions to w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 0 mod p, with w, x, y, z E Zp, 
which is likely easier to prove. 
Theorem 4: The set of solutions (a, b, c, d) E Hp for the equation 
a 2 + b2 + c2 + ~ + a(b + c + d) = 0 mod p has the same cardinality as 
the set of solutions for w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 0. 
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Proof: Let w, x, y, z E Zp be a solution to w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 0 mod p. 
Then we set a= 2w, b = x-w, c = y-w, d = z-w, so that a2 +b2 +c2+~+ 
a(b+c+d) = 4w2 +x2 -2wx+w2+y2 -2wy+w2+z2 -2wz+w2+2w(x-
w+y-w+z-w) = 7w2+x2+y2+z2-2w(x+y+z)+2w(x+y+z-3w) = 
w2 + x2 + y2 + z2 = 0. 
Since this mapping is one-to-one and onto, the sets have the same number 
of elements. D 
We have verified that our conjecture is correct for p = 7, so we know 
that each cell can take on any of p4 - p3 - p2 + p different states. The five 
cell CA with p = 7 will have about 3.3 x 1013 possible states. For larger 
values of p the correction due to eliminating the zero-divisors becomes less 
and less significant, so that the total number of five-cell states approaches p20 • 
As for the second question, we note that if (a, b, c, d) is a solution to 
N(a,b,c,d) = 0, then N(ga,gb,gc,gd) = (ga)2 + (gb)2 + (gc)2 + (gd)2 + 
ga(gb + gc + gd) = g2(a2 + b2 + 2 + ~ + a(b + c +d)) = g2(0) = 0 mod p 
is also a solution, for any g E Zp. In particular, if we have a zero-divisor 
(a, b, c, d), with, say b =f:. 0, then b will generate the additive group of Zp, so 
that if we let g take on the values 1, 2, ... ,p- 1, we will have p- 1 zero-
divisors, and the digits 1, 2 ... ,p- 1 will each appear once in the second 
position. Because of this, the non-zero elements of Zp will be uniformly dis-
tributed as coefficients in the group of units. 
Since this argument does not extend to the appearance of zeros as co-
efficients of zero-divisors, we choose to ignore them whenever they are the 
output digit of the CA generator, so that we can compare the remaining 
digits to a random uniform distribution. This has the added advantage that 
we are now considering an even number of output symbols, so that there is 
an obvious way to map to Z2, which was lacking when the output symbols 
were all p elements of Zp· 
With this out of the way, we can analyze the output of a CA generator. 
For a run of 1400 iterations, with the output digit taken as the j coefficient, 
there were 1172 non-zero outputs (zero was the output digit 228 times): 
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output digit number of occurences expected number of occurences 
1 198 195.33 
2 193 195.33 
3 208 195.33 
4 186 195.33 
5 204 195.33 
6 183 195.33 
The chi-squared sum for this is 2.49488, which corresponds to a p-value 
of approximately .22. 
For the spacing: Ill 2 3 4 5 6 
0 33 27 34 28 41 28 30.500 
1 28 34 31 22 26 29 25.417 
2 26 19 24 23 32 17 21.181 
3 16 18 21 28 24 24 17.650 
4 13 15 17 16 8 12 14.709 
5 16 15 14 12 10 10 12.257 
6 17 11 17 10 11 11 10.214 
7 8 7 9 6 10 7 8.512 
8 10 7 9 5 12 5 7.093 
9 5 9 1 6 5 7 5.911 
10 1 6 4 4 2 3 4.926 
11 0 6 6 2 3 6 4.105 
12 4 3 5 3 2 2 3.421 
13 0 2 5 1 0 3 2.851 
> 14 21 14 11 20 18 19 14.253 
The last column represents the expected values for the spacing of the six 
column. That is, if these numbers were truly random, we would expect to 
see adjacent sixes 30.5 times, while we observed them 28 times. 
These produce the following chi-squared values: 
Chi-squared for 1 spacing is 12.31882 
Chi-squared for 2 spacing is 15.00070 
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Chi-squared for 3 spacing is 14.71301 
Chi-squared for 4 spacing is 4.06404 
Chi-squared for 5 spacing is 11.16476 
Chi-squared for 6 spacing is 14.76778 
The p-values for these range between .005 and .6. 
As we stated earlier, having good statistics is only one requirement of 
a CSPRNG. A CSPRNG must also have cycles with long periods. For the 
generators we examined, we could not make any a priori statements about 
the lengths of the arcs. Because the LCG and the LFSR performs so poorly 
on the statistical tests, we did not even investigate their arc lengths or cy-
cle periods. However, we used Ritter's technique a number of times for the 
CA generator, and were surprised by the results. The cycles we observed 
all seemed to have period 144. As for the arc lengths, there were instances 
where the generator completed five thousand iterations without entering a 
cycle. 
VII. Breaking a Non-Commutative Generator 
As we stated earlier, the non-commutivity of the reconstruction equations 
is a hindrance to their solutions, but this difficulty is not insurmountable. 
To illustrate one technique to break a generator, we will look at the non-
commutative LFSR. Recall that this generator is defined by 
Let us suppose that we have access to x0, x11 and x2, which are equal 
to (x0,1, x0,2, x0,3, x0,4), (xl,b x1,2, x1,3, x1,4), and (x2,1, x2,2, x2,3, x2,4), respec-
tively. Then, if we write a as (a1, a2, a3, a4) and b as (b1, b2, b3, b4), then we 
can set up eight linear equations in the eight unknowns bi and ai. The first 
equation would set the (coefficient of X1 equal to the (coefficient of axo+xob, 
and would look like: 
X1,1 = a1xo,1 - ( a2 + a3 + a4)xo,1 - b1xo,1 
(b2 + b3 + b4)xo,1- 2a2xo,2- 2b2xo,2- 2a3xo,3 
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2b3xo,3 - 2a4xo,4 - 2b4xo,4 
a1(xo,2 + xo,3 + xo,4)- b1(xo,2 + xo,3 + xo,4)· 
The remaining seven equations would give us enough to be able to solve 
for a and b. Knowledge of these gives us the next-state equation, which would 
allow us to reconstruct the output in its entirety. 
While an adaptation of this method of attack can be employed against 
any of the generators we considered, it loses its efficacy when used against the 
Cellular Automata generator. The reason for this is that the CA generator 
is non-linear, which makes the equations far more difficult to solve simulta-
neously. In fact, given the values of the five cells of a state, the computer 
algebra package Mathematica was unable to solve for the previous state, even 
after twelve hours of running! This would suggest promise for the CA gen-
erator as a one-way function, in addition to its qualities as a CSPRNG. 
VIII. Conclusion 
While we examined only a sampling of generators, it is clear that the non-
commutative versions are not always superior to their commutative cousins. 
There is one notable exception, the CA generator. It produced good statis-
tics, and breaking it seems to be difficult even with p = 7 and five cells. 
A larger value of p and more cells could only make it more secure. Also, 
while these generators may be somewhat slow in software, there is hardware 
support for 4 x 4 matrix multiplication, which could be used to multiply 
elements of Hp. 
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